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MS. JULIET SORENSEN:  Good afternoon, Everyone. I'm so pleased and really honored 
to be moderating the afternoon panel related to the book launch, yet another truly important 
book by my colleague, Steve Lubet. 
The title of this afternoon's panel is “Ethnography, Ethics and the Law,” and we'll be 
focusing on comparative issues of confidentiality, privilege, counseling or participation in 
criminal conduct, as well as reporting misconduct and responsiveness to subpoenas as they 
arise both in law practice, legal research and scholarship, and social science research. 
Before I go further I should probably introduce myself. My name is Juliet Sorenson. 
I'm a professor here at Northwestern Law School. I'm the director of the Bluhm Legal 
Clinic and the associate dean for clinical education. And as I said before, I am happy to be 
here for my colleague, Steve Lubet. 
We have two presenters and two respondents. Our presenters are Bob Nelson and 
Peter Moskos, to my left. And we're going to be starting by hearing from Professor Nelson. 
Bob Nelson is a professor of sociology at Northwestern University and he's the MacCrate 
Research Chair and director emeritus at the American Bar Foundation, conveniently for us 
located in this building. He's a scholar of law and inequality, with a particular focus on the 
legal profession, as well as organizations and discrimination law. He is the author or editor 
of no less than nine books. And his latest book, Rights on Trial, which he has co-authored, 
builds on his earlier work on gender inequality in organizations, which includes Legalizing 
Gender Inequality: Courts, Markets, and Unequal Pay for Women in America, which won 
the best book prize from the American Sociological Association. So, Bob, over to you. 
 
MR. ROBERT NELSON:  Thank you very much, Juliet. And thanks, Steve and Gary, for 
organizing this. I think Steve made reference yesterday to the fact that the summer after 
my first year of law school I worked in the clinic and Steve was one of the faculty members 
there. And we were both considerably younger then. I was in the JD-Ph.D. program at that 
time, but the way it was structured back then was you did a year of law school, a year of 
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grad school, a year of law school, a year of grad school, and then finished things up. So the 
following year I had my education in ethnography from Howard Becker. So it is interesting 
how these circles come back around. And what I want to talk about— 
 
MR. STEVEN LUBET:  I took a course from him as an undergrad. 
 
MR. ROBERT NELSON:  Oh, you did?  Very good. So I'm a social scientist who is 
interested in advancing social theory through empirical search. And I am interested in how 
we can improve social research, and that is the perspective I bring to looking at Lubet's 
book and asking to what extent it contributes to that enterprise. And as a sociologist of law 
and someone who studies law and inequality in various ways, very often looking at 
powerful actors—lawyers—but also less powerful actors—such as women who experience 
inequality in pay in organizations—or looking at the targets of discrimination and the 
experiences they have in the litigation process, I am keenly sensitive to the power dynamics 
that we encounter in our work.  
 A lot of what we are doing research on is power and inequality. So I'm going to 
echo a lot of the remarks we've already heard from yesterday and today, but try and bring 
them together a little more with a kind of focus in the sociology world. So, I think we 
literally work in the field of power. That's not just like a slogan, you know. We actually are 
interacting with the law and the power in law in various ways.  
 So if we just think through the various powers of law and how it affects our work, 
and in respect to my own work, law can be very helpful in generating data. Documents that 
are produced in discovery in litigation become a very rich set of materials on organizations. 
Very often the materials, like testimony, are given under oath and with cross-examination. 
And so even though the data are not collected for the purposes of social research, they have 
these interesting and important characteristics. But law can also be a barrier. So 
confidentiality agreements in employment civil rights, for example, as well as many other 
areas, then become a barrier for understanding what happens in those cases. And in 
Legalizing Gender Equality, the book that I did with Bill Bridges some years ago, we 
identified a set of case studies. And several times we went out to talk to lawyers. They were 
interested in sharing their documents with us on a case. We began to go through the files, 
and we would come upon a confidentiality agreement, which meant that we are not going 
to be able to use that material.  
 I'll talk a little more about one of the four cases that we used in Legalizing Gender 
Equality. It's a case we referred to by a pseudonym because we went through the files and 
discovered some confidentiality agreements, but they were not complete. So we decided 
the better part of wisdom was to not identify the organization: to anonymize it. We used a 
lot of the data or the documents from that case, and did some interviews with the actors 
around that case, but we decided not to possibly disturb a powerful corporate actor who 
might act to try to silence that research, that part of the research. Law is also potentially a 
threat.  
 And so, Shamus, your subpoena is Exhibit No. 1 of that. And I think, you know, 
even though Steve in the book says they're very rare—only happen like once a year or 
whatever—I think it is a shadow that hangs over a lot of research, especially in certain 
areas of research. So what we usually are doing in this area is working under conditions of 
regulation by an IRB or controlled by an IRB. And I think as we've sort of surfaced earlier 
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today, there is a tension between the protection of subjects and various practices that some 
folks had suggested here, like unmasking, you know, not masking confidential data.   
But I think this is also in part an internalized value or norm for researchers that we're 
not only interested in protecting our subjects, but also getting more candor from our 
subjects because their identities are kept confidential. And in the kind of work that I have 
done, which involves also working inside organizations, that kind of anonymity has been 
very important to getting candor. One of the questions I was tempted to ask this morning 
of Steve Mills was how can you tell when people are lying to you? That's something we 
have to keep in mind all the time. You have to do that when you're doing the fieldwork in 
an organization. Some people are just going to give you a self-interested account and you're 
not going to know for sure. You will hear other perspectives from other people in your 
organization and you have to kind of weigh that.  
 I think when you report the research, you know, you are sort of weaving a tapestry 
of the results you're going to report, but very often you do have to report those possibilities 
of bias or self-interested statements or whatever. Usually the informants who you think are 
just giving you self-serving statements tend not to show up in your reports because you 
discount them, not according to a simple formula but in terms of your sense of the situation. 
One thing I just want to mention is certificates of confidentiality. Which is—Shamus, I 
assume—did you get that for the current study? 
 
MR. SHAMUS KHAN: I have them for the current study. But they've never been tested in 
court, have they? 
 
MR. ROBERT NELSON: I think they have. I think they're pretty— 
 
MR. SHAMUS KHAN: Our lawyers are, like, you can have them, but there is not a lot of 
legal precedent for them, but they haven't really been rigorously and fully tested. So we 
cautioned all of our participants to this fact because we didn't want to promise them that 
we could give them this certificate and that it had definitive legal standing. 
 
MR. ROBERT NELSON: Well— 
 
MR. SHAMUS KHAN:  I could be wrong. There are lawyers here that— 
 
MR. ROBERT NELSON:  I think you're probably wrong. I hope you're wrong. I mean, it's 
not like—this is somewhat being expanded in terms of access to these certificates. 
Anybody who gets an NIH grant now is automatically granted a certificate of 
confidentiality. And it's not limited to projects that are funded by NIH, it is others—not 
just federally funded research but other research. And the scope of that—there is something 
about how the research has to have something to do with HHS's mission, but it's not just 
clinical research, it includes behavioral research. So it is a resource that we should probably 
take a look at it.  
 But the other way in which we are dealing with  power as we do this kind of research 
and try and study sociology of law is we are dealing with powerful actors, whether it's the 
police, the courts, legal professionals, or the corporations that have a lot of legal 
professionals who work for them. And a big challenge for the researcher to understand 
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these kinds of organizations is how to get access to study them. And, you know, maybe 
Lubet's book and maybe Colin's and Shamus's new collection is going to urge me to 
reconsider this, but I always thought it was smart to provide confidentiality to informants 
to get access and to get more candid interview responses from them.  
 But then I also think there is the concern about imbalances of power amongst the 
groups we are dealing with and trying to study. So there are populations who are at risk, 
and the question is how do you get access to them, how do you protect them. And so in the 
research on employment discrimination, for example—or even just the other research on 
organizational pay systems—in talking to less powerful actors who might have suffered 
negative consequences if their identities were revealed in our research, it was valuable, in 
my view, to provide them with anonymity. So I think, you know, the topic of this panel 
sort of brings to focus what are the ethical and the legal obligations for researchers in the 
face of these kinds of issues. And what I want to argue for is very much what Claudio was 
suggesting. I think implicit in a lot of Mary's remarks, et cetera, is an argument for basically 
the use of professional judgment by researchers in a regulated environment. Because we 
are in a regulated environment. 
 Now, I think Steve raised a lot of interesting examples. You know, Chapter 8 where 
he's looking at legality, criminality, you know, about how to deal with different kinds of 
situations where you might be involved in criminal activity or might learn in advance about 
criminal activity. And, you know, Lubet is kind of interesting, he doesn't really say very 
much about what people should actually do. Right?  I mean, you sort of say it's kind of an 
inherent obligation to not violate the law, but it's very—that's sort of about all you say. I 
guess it's— 
 
MR. STEVEN LUBET:  You never were a very close reader, Bob. 
 
MR. ROBERT NELSON:  But he does throw out, you know, those contrasts between, for 
example, the cases of, you know, Contreras and Goffman and Venkatesh who were really 
close to criminal behavior, and by some accounts were either encouraging it or 
participating in it. And then—but also contrasting it with cases like Laud Humphreys and 
The Tea Room Trade, which involves homosexual behavior in public bathrooms, or 
Howard Becker, Becoming a Marijuana User, and do we want to treat them the same way, 
you know, for those researchers.  
 You know, the first three obviously involve victims, crimes that involve victims. 
The second—the last two are, you know, victimless crimes. I think it's a serious question. 
I think I would sort of fall back on the general position to rely on the professional judgment 
of researchers to make these judgments. But I'm not exactly sure I'm comfortable with that.  
But then there is the issue is of masking and confidentiality. So I've already made the 
pitch, basically, that it aids the quality of research. And I think that is a very important 
argument to make.  So let me just do some research biography here. So my first book, 
my first study, was a case study of four law firms in Chicago way back in the late 1970s, 
right?  The book wasn't published until like '88, but those four law firms were identified 
by pseudonyms. None of the informants were identified individually. It entailed a 
combination of survey work with a fairly large sample in each of the four organizations, 
and then interviews with elites in those firms. There is no way I could have gotten access 
to those firms without that kind of bargain. The data collection was so intense, in a way, 
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that, you know, there may have been some parts of the analysis that you could question à 
la Lubet. But part of the bargain with these firms was that they had a chance to read my 
interpretation or analysis of their firm, not for the purpose of editing, but for the purpose 
of seeing whether or not their identity had been disclosed.  
 They all thought that they could identify—that their firm would be identified. 
Essentially they didn't care. They let me go ahead and publish the work. Now, that's a very 
tricky kind of negotiation, but I would not encourage other people to try and copy it because 
it is sort of dependent on the decisions of powerful people. But without that kind of 
confidentiality I would not have gotten that kind of access, and we would know less about 
corporate law firms. And, you know, the book didn't pull punches.  
 You know, there is this—another sort of argument that we've been having at this 
conference is about whether or not you're sort of taking pre-positions when you're doing 
research and therefore you're going to select certain findings to confirm a thesis. Very often 
in this kind of work we are discovering what's going on and then we mount an argument. 
And if you don't mount an argument, in some respects it's not going to have any impact or 
make any kind of meaningful intervention. So it doesn't mean that you're necessarily 
rejecting all the contrary evidence, but you need to come down in some respect to have 
some kind of parsimonious argument about what all this material is. So in the Legalizing 
Gender Inequality book, three of the case studies involved organizations that were revealed 
in litigation and so there is no mystery about who the organizations were; there were a lot 
of public documents that were available for people to look at.  
 But then when we did do sort of qualitative interviews around those cases to talk to 
the different actors involved in it, we did provide confidentiality. And, you know, there 
were some things that I'm quite sure people would not have said to us, which I think are 
very credible, but they wouldn't have said them to us if we had not provided anonymity. 
So I remember in the State of Washington case, the AFSCME v. State of Washington case, 
there was a union official who said that although they went along with filing the lawsuit, it 
was primarily to defend against women organizing in unions and that they were really more 
invested in collective bargaining because they thought backdoor negotiations were going 
to be better for basically male dominated occupations. And his phrase was, "We're not 
going to rob Peter to pay Pauline." Now, if that were public or that was attributed to that 
individual, that would have been tough, I think.  
 Then in Rights On Trial—I've got a new book, Rights On Trial, which is also, all 
my work is, mixed methods. This is mixed methods too. It involves a large quantitative 
data set of employment discrimination lawsuits which we analyze quantitatively. But then 
we also drew a random sub-sample of individuals, parties, both plaintiffs and defendants 
and their lawyers. And so we have conflicting perspectives on what happened in these 
cases. For this book we actually got permission in the consent form to tape record and use 
the tape recordings. So you can go online to the website and listen to the voices of these 
respondents. But they're not identified by name. And the voices I think are very helpful. It 
brings what we call verisimilitude to what we're doing. It's very informative, you know, in 
terms of the race and class and professional positions of the people we're talking to. But 
the other thing that is interesting, I think, for—you know, in this book, it sort of 
demonstrates in an empirical way what we talked about a few times already. There are 
contested views of these cases. You know, these parties do not share the same view.  
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 The plaintiffs don't have the same view as the lawyers. They certainly have different 
perspectives than the defendants and their lawyers. So there is no one reality in these cases. 
And I think that's very common, I think, in social research. But maybe looking at a 
controversy like this it's more pronounced. So, I think that's just, you know, kind of an 
important part of what we were trying to capture as we reported these different 
perspectives.  
 Now, one thing that one of our cases or one of our chapters reports is a story from 
a plaintiff in which he said that the judge sitting on the bench announced in the courtroom 
what happened in the OJ Simpson trial. The OJ Simpson verdict had come in, and he 
announced that from the bench. It had nothing to do with the case he was hearing. And 
these plaintiffs had the view that—and then right at the end of the trial the judge wrote a 
ruling and ruled against them. And the plaintiffs were convinced if it had not been for the 
OJ Simpson verdict they would have won the case.  
 Now, actually, what Steve has prompted me to do—we do actually cite the 
transcript for part of what the judge says in the ruling of the case. But I haven't gone back 
to look to see whether or not the trial transcript has OJ Simpson in it. It probably is not on 
the record, actually, but I'm prompted now by what you have suggested and I'm going to 
go back and take a look. So this suggests—you know, in a way I think it's important for us 
to understand the politics of research. What I've described to you is a lot of sort of political 
negotiation in the process of doing research. But I also think that we need to keep in mind 
the big politics of research.  
 And there is a danger, you know, that in Lubet's critique that it's going to be 
attacking or undermining this kind of research. And I know that is not what Steve has in 
mind, and I know all of us as scholars when we publish things know we don't have control 
over how it's used or interpreted. But it is a danger I think. So to assess Lubet, you know, 
and the overall importance of the book, I would say that, despite many disagreements with 
Steve, that this is a very helpful provocation for ethnographers. And, you know, even 
though it may not really be a corrective to what we do in this field, I think I'm still going 
to encourage my students to provide anonymity. But it's very important to have the 
conversation, so for that I appreciate it.  
 
MS. JULIET SORENSEN:  Thank you very much, Bob. Before I introduce Peter Moskos, 
I just wanted to pick up on one point that you made, and that is there is no one reality. I 
think that is actually true in any of the truth-seeking professions, be that law, sociology or 
otherwise. I recall a public corruption trial that I participated in when I was an assistant 
U.S. Attorney, and it was, at least we had thought, a very strong case in terms of the strength 
of the evidence as presented to a jury. In brief, there were three codefendants. There were 
extensive tape recordings admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule in our case in chief. 
There was a cooperating witness who was, of course, vigorously cross-examined on the 
terms of—actually, there were two cooperating witnesses—of his and her respective 
cooperation deals with the government.  
 When the verdict came in, it was a truly mixed verdict. One defendant was 
convicted, found guilty by the jury. One defendant was the result of a hung jury; the jury 
could not agree as to a verdict to that particular defendant. And the third defendant, who 
was the wife of one of the other codefendants, was acquitted, she was found not guilty. So 
we proceeded to retry the person whom the jury had hung on. And, of course, the second 
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jury doesn't know anything about the previous trial, right? They're not allowed to hear 
references to the fact that the previous jury couldn't agree on the verdict the first time 
around as to this one remaining defendant.  
 Now, I will tell you that the verdict came in on the retrial, and this person was found 
guilty of having participated in a City Hall bribery scheme. We were given permission, 
along with defense counsel, to interview the jury after the verdict was returned. And the 
number one question was, why didn't you charge the wife? She's all over the tapes. She's 
complicit, she's clearly guilty. Why wasn't she on trial with her husband? And, of course, 
we couldn't answer the question, which is to say we had tried her and she had been found 
not guilty by a jury of her peers.  
 To your point that there is no one reality; truth is elusive, no matter what the 
methods are that are used to try to determine it. With that in mind, our next presenter has 
an official biography that states that he studies people the old-fashioned way, he talks to 
them. So I'm pleased to introduce Peter Moskos, an associate professor at John Jay College 
of Criminal Justice at CUNY. Which, by the way, is near where I grew up. And the author 
of Cop in the Hood, as well as two other books. A former police officer and a sociologist 
trained at Harvard and Princeton. We're happy to have you. 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  Thank you. Thanks for having me here. It is good to be back in 
the great city of Chicago. But New York is better. So before I start with what I prepared, I 
want to mention Rashomon, the movie, because it was one of my father's favorite movies. 
And some of you knew my father, who was a sociology professor at Northwestern. And he 
always referred to the idea that one happening could have different viewpoints and 
perceptions, and I use that illusion many times. And then I finally watched the movie many 
years later, which I found kind of boring, by the way, but I was surprised because what he 
left out of the story and the concept of the Rashomon; there's not just different perceptions 
of one reality, it actually presents a different reality.  
 The stories are not possible all at the same time, which sort of brings to light what—
I forget who mentioned the four books of the Gospels. There are different stories; it is not 
four interpretations. Yeah. It's always good to bring in religion in sociology. Academics 
love that. But what I really wanted to start with was a confessional of when I committed 
my first felony. When I was fifteen or sixteen working at the Evanston movie theatre on 
Central Street I got drunk after work and with a friend we, I'd say broke into Dyche 
Stadium. It wasn't even breaking in. We would go in there a lot to play because you could 
just crawl under the fences, ride your bikes up and down ramps, jump on big mats. But I 
think because of the alcohol and the youth, I decided it would be fun to tear down the 
goalpost, because, you know, that's what you do.  
 We went to the goalpost and I put a belt around it and tried to tear it down. Those 
things are tough to tear down, I found out. And I did not succeed, but I did succeed in 
damaging it. And it stayed damaged for weeks because it costs a lot of money to replace 
those damn things. I felt kind of guilty. But given the amount of dollar damage I probably 
committed to Northwestern's athletic department, it probably would have qualified as a 
felony. A few years later when, funny, that same friend turned twenty-one. He was a 
student at Northwestern, he was a good friend of my brother's. And when he turned twenty-
one, we went to the DMV to get me a fake ID. And it's not a fake ID, it was a real ID, it 
was an Illinois license with his name and my picture. And there were huge signs saying if 
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you are doing exactly what I was doing, it is a felony. And we looked at the sign, and they 
called his name, and I stood up and I got my picture taken. And I was a young looking 18-
year-old too.  
 I mention that not out of pride or trying to get it off my chest, but simply I found 
something slightly precious in Steve's description of crimes committed by the 
ethnographer, which I want to separate from witnessing other people committing the crime. 
But the idea that someone legally did by most standards take part in and was an accomplice 
to an attempted murder. I know your argument runs deeper than it was just summarized, as 
an ethnographer we can all agree we should all follow the law, but I actually disagree with 
that. I don't think we should all follow the law. I won't go through many examples, but, I 
mean, I ride a bike through red, I don't commit many—I try not to commit felonies. But 
the argument in the book, what is it, three or how many felonies a day, that we all violate 
the law all the time.  
 I don't think anyone here hasn't violated a law, whether it is drug use, traffic laws, 
or more serious crimes where people actually get hurt and injured. I have done a few other 
things that I'm not telling you about, by the way. Those are just the ones I'm admitting. So 
all that is in the—so I do sort of believe John Van Maanen, which is where I stole the line 
about I talk to people the old-fashioned way. That's stolen straight from him. He was a 
great influence and advisor when he was at MIT and when I was at Harvard. He's still as 
MIT. He did a study on police in the late 60s in Seattle where he went to the police 
academy, so I started my research basically following in his footsteps. And he said that 
often our crime was one of confession. 
  Now, I would say maybe that's not our only crime from an ethical academic 
standpoint. But was she an accomplice to an attempted murder? Well, I did want to point 
out, nobody did get hurt. And the accomplice laws, along with conspiracy laws, I think are, 
you know, too broadly defined from an ethical standpoint. But that's sort of neither here 
nor there from saying that is the law, and I think she would have been guilty as charged. It 
would have been shocking if someone would be charged for a felony in which nothing did 
happen. You know, if there was intent, as she stated, you know, I wasn't there, but I kind 
of think there was intent. I think she was guilty of that. I don't think it was a morning ritual. 
I think she went in to kill the son of bitch. But they didn't. So she could have left that out, 
I don't—but she chose to include it. You can hold that against her personally, just like you 
can hold my crimes and sins against me personally. But I don't think it distracts at all from 
her ethnography. I want to make that distinction, because I think there are other more valid 
criticisms.  
 Specifically, I mean, to put it bluntly, one's a fraud. And I find some of your points 
more convincing than others. I do think that the standard that a critic has, though, in a way 
should be even higher than the standard of the original researcher. I thought, as came up 
yesterday about people's first perceptions. I won't mention the E word. People's first 
perceptions to an object. I found it believable; you didn't. I would be willing to give the 
researcher the benefit of the doubt, because she was there and we weren't. 
 
MR. STEVEN LUBERT:  Well, she wasn't there. If she had been there, it would be 
different. 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  Oh, you're right. 
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MR. STEVEN LUBET:  If she'd been there, I would not have argued. 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  I would also mention the power dynamic that, absent a teacher, 
if the kids had seen—if the kids knew what an elevator was—there, I said it, what an 
elevator was. I think it's almost irrelevant. I don't think a teacher would know. The same 
way you could ask somebody in Baltimore, do you know that your neighbor right now has 
four kids living on a roach-encrusted mattress with no food and no functional adult in the 
house, and they may not know that either.  
 You can be very close to something and not know it. This gets a little more to my 
sort of personal fieldwork. I did write—when I received your manuscript, of course I 
immediately went to the index and I wasn't in there. It was a corrected proof. Where am I?  
Flip, flip, flip. And I thought, hey, he hardly mentions me. And then I read this thing and I 
was, like, thank God. So I will take that as a sign that my research passed your judgment 
that I know I'm only alluded to tangentially. But I did worry going so—because there is no 
reason you should know.  
 My story in brief is I went into grad school in 1995 in sociology. The crime drop 
was happening. All the experts in the field were saying the crime drop wasn't happening 
and couldn't happen because we weren't addressing the root causes. Meanwhile it continued 
to happen, and I said, my God, if everybody is wrong, this is a good field to get into. So I 
found John Van Maanen, who is, I think—is he writing Qualitative Methods, Tales of the 
Field? Is that still— 
 
MS. ANYA DEGENSHEIN:  There is a new version. 
 
MR. CLAUDIO BENZECRY:  There is a new version. 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  He works a mile from my house. He was wonderfully supportive, 
as I found everything in ethnography to be, unlike a lot of academia. I received nothing but 
support. I didn't actually know I wrote an ethnography, people don't believe this, until way 
after it was out until it was either Mitch or Eli Anderson told me I had. I was sort of 
unfamiliar with the term because my department was very quantitative. I wrote—I don't 
know. I wrote a dissertation. I knew it was qualitative, but I didn't know the concept of an 
ethnography. It might have helped me; I don't know. So I went to be a participant observer 
in Baltimore in the police academy, and they approved it, surprisingly, through a personal 
Greek connection.  
 It's important to mention. I had two departments approve my research and both had 
personal connections through Greek Americans. Other departments wouldn't return my 
phone call. Anyway, I go into Baltimore and there was a new commissioner who did not 
share those connections and he said, here, on the first day of the academy, no, you get out 
of here, kid. I don't think he actually knew I was there. He vetoed my research. He came 
down to me and I met him and the acting police commissioner in his office, and he said, 
"Well, why don't you want to become a cop for real?" I said, "Well, who would hire me 
knowing I'm going to quit after a year," though I stayed longer, "and write a book on it?"  
And he said, "Well, if you get hired, I would." And he was true—I didn't consider him my 
ally, but he was true to his word and he honored his commitment.  
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 So I was in Baltimore for two years. I know the book says one year. That's a test of 
careful reading. I didn't want to put two years, because it was just under two years. But I 
didn't want to be criticized by someone saying you weren't there for two years. I was there 
for about twenty, twenty-two months total and then went back and finished my dissertation. 
So I was worried going into Baltimore about what would I see. I do not come from a police 
background, I didn't have friends who were cops. I didn't know Baltimore at all. And then 
I'm going into basically a dysfunctional city and into a dysfunctional police department. 
And then after the academy they assign me to a dysfunctional district, the Eastern District, 
which is where The Wire was filmed. And then I go to midnight shift and it's sort of—I 
mean, you know, this is the proverbial “Heart of Darkness.”  I didn't know what to expect. 
So what will I do if—when—I see bad things?  
 This does get into the issue of the IRB, which I want to describe a bit more because 
I think most of us feel we understand it. And some of us, especially the journalists, may 
have no idea what we're talking about. So it came out of abusive research, specifically the 
Tuskegee syphilis experiment is a big one, but there are other examples of bad research. 
And somehow it was applied to social science research, when I think it was meant more 
for medical research. So perhaps that oversight is good. But it has become a tough barrier 
to ethnographic work. And I find that interesting and disappointing because I don't 
understand why professors with tenure who talk about academic freedom have such 
unwillingness to push back on systems. I don't understand why IRB boards in general—
and it sounds like, Gary, that you did—are so willing to not push back or test the limits of 
the regulation or regulatory requirements, and instead seem very quick to say, "Oh, let's 
just apply it to everything." That's the easiest way out.  
 I find it's a lack of spine in the academic community to say no; we will follow the 
regulations and the law, but we're not going to—we're not going to be excessive about this. 
And our interests are not to please the bureaucrat, or even our university's legal department, 
which of course the university might disagree, but the professors don't have to agree with 
that. Our goal is to do what and only what is required. One way you could say is ethical 
research. I don't think anyone denies that. Of course, the devil is in the details in what that 
means. Generally, it is believed, whether it's proper or not and it's true, that IRB boards 
demand signed informed consents—signed consent forms and unequivocal conditions of 
anonymity.  
 I tested those limits, and I have always done my research explicitly stating I'm not 
going to get signed consent forms and I'm not going to guarantee anonymity. And I don't 
just say "nah nah." I mean, I defend it in a longer form. But the basic argument is I cannot 
get signed consent forms. I mean, you walk in—if this is a police station and I walk in there 
it's physically impossible for me to get signed consent forms from everyone. You consent 
by being there. To benefit me—on the other hand, you really don't have the right of refusal, 
though, honestly. I've given out surveys and gotten 100% response rates. And cops carry 
their own pens; it's a researcher's dream. I tell them—I mean, because it is an IRB 
requirement—I say you don't have to do this. But because someone approved me to be 
there and they're doing it, they all basically do. Occasionally you get somebody who kind 
of fills it out not for real. But it's—yeah, I get fabulous response rates.  
 But the bulk of my research is qualitative, informal interviews, and it would 
impossible to get signed consent forms. People know who I am. But the other problem I 
have before oral history was exempted from IRB—which our first memos said, oh, we'll 
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still keep the requirement. What? Which I thought crazy. But the government said oral 
history is not covered. I don't know what their stand is now, but the university said, oh, we 
still (inaudible). It's more protection. No. No, it's not. I did interviews in an oral history 
style, and like was just mentioned, it felt very legalistic to give this consent form. I realized, 
look, I'm talking—and, of course, this is hard, I'm not talking to a vulnerable community, 
I'm talking to people with at least a high school diploma, police officers who are retired, 
but positions of power. If anything, they're the ones doing the abusing and not the abused 
and vulnerable.   
So I'm giving you a form, let's say, and I'm not giving this form for your sake. You 
know exactly what you're doing. This form is actually to protect me. And I find that an 
absurd use of the IRB where the only job, the purpose of the IRB broadly defined is ethical 
research, but specifically to protect research subjects. And this form that you just signed 
does not protect you at all. In fact, quite the opposite. You're better if you never signed it. 
If I did something unethical, you can come back and say I'm going to sue you because it 
gives you more power. You feel, and to some extent you have signed away your rights 
through informed consent. And that I find is an absurd concept. So that's something else I 
need to get out of this. The way I get out of promising anonymous research is I say that 
there are things—if I were to watch a cop commit a horrible crime, damn right I would rat 
him out. It would have to be pretty bad, honestly. But I can certainly imagine a situation 
where my obligations are not to my research subjects, they're to the person who was just 
tortured.  
 Am I supposed to guarantee? That struck me as absurd. At least with my IRB board, 
and maybe a little better at a college of criminal justice, I haven't had a great problem with 
it. But it is time-consuming, it is a pain, and there is the assumption that it won't—that it's 
not going to happen. So you get this idea of masking identity from an ethical standpoint, 
and there is a long tradition. I think the urge should be—I did not mask my location at all 
because it's public record. I find some masking that sociologists and ethnographers do kind 
of funny. One of my projects whenever I get an article or a book to review is unmasking. 
You know, doing a little detective work on Google, and I can usually find the location in 
ten, fifteen minutes. Now, maybe that's a certain barrier that does protect subjects, that I 
had to want to do it. But I mention this to the author, and some of them are, like, oh, and 
they do a better job of defining it. But they always give these characteristics that give it 
away. And then I have a pet peeve that the pseudonyms are always these boring names. I 
don't want to read about small town. At least give them a name that sounds interesting. All 
the characters end up being called Bob and John and so on. Like, good God, as a reader my 
eyes glaze over.  
 I did, of course, protect—I did change the names of my research subjects because 
in the beginning they were paranoid of a researcher coming around. They did not even 
know what sociology was. Not just ethnography, they didn't know what sociology was. 
Often I was described as a psychologist. I would say, "No, I'm not a psychologist." "What 
do you do?" I was like, "Oh, I'm going to write a book about policing." And that was usually 
good enough. But I would say I'm not writing a book about you personally. But they did 
not have to write a refusal. Well, they did not have the right to not be included in my book. 
Two people, only two people said specifically I don't want anything to do with your book. 
One, interestingly, was fired soon after the academy, sort of an ethical thing. And the other 
wrote me later, years later, and said, "Oh, man, I loved your book." He's actually the one I 
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quote saying I don't want to be in your book. But I didn't quote him saying that. I was like, 
"It's you, Lieutenant." And he's like, "Well, I didn't know what you were up to and I didn't 
know if you could be trusted." 
 My angle is to give people plausible deniability. Because I do quote cops saying 
things that are, you know, if they were on Facebook or YouTube they could get fired for. 
I just wanted them to say no, I didn't say it, for their sake. That said, I gave the manuscript 
to everyone I worked with. Most everyone I worked with. I don't think they read it, by the 
way, which I thought was interesting because it's not very intellectual. I mean, I wrote 
about a work experience. Anyway. But I never received any complaints. Those who did 
read it loved it because—and it's a term not normally used on police officers, but simply 
because I gave them a voice. It's not a term that they would use. But they felt 
misunderstood, they felt picked on, and they just wanted the truth to be told. As long as I 
told the truth, they didn't care that they weren't portrayed as angels or heroes, or even 
always good workers. I have not received a single bad comment, literally a single bad 
comment from any police officer who has actually read the book. I was worried, actually, 
but I'm surprised at that. They just wanted the truth out. But the IRB issue is real and I 
think will prevent more un-anonymous work, and I don't know what we can do about that, 
except for pushback.  
 In some ways I think perhaps we should claim a slightly more journalistic standard 
because I've got First Amendment issues with the IRB. I go down and visit, less often every 
year, but I still go see the people who are in my book. I went there—down there about two 
months ago. I talk to them about everything. I am in their living room, literally, with Fox 
News on TV. And I don't know if I'll use that in a future published work. I might. 
Technically it's against the rules because I don't have IRB approval. But, damn it, these are 
my friends and this is their living room and it's simply impossible for me to get IRB 
approval for my life. I didn't go down there with the intent of doing research, but it certainly 
becomes that at some point. And there is a gray area for a lot of ethnographers between 
your life when you're immersed in the field and research, and the IRB concept is horribly 
suited for the problem for ethnographers.  
 The last thing I'll mention on that, getting approval without informed consent. I do 
say, look, if you want, I could lie and say I'm going to do this, and that has certainly 
happened with other research with signed consent forms in the past. But I'm not going to 
lie. It cannot be done. So either the research—either ethnography the way I do it can't be 
done, or you have to approve it the way I want to do. And they did it. So push back more 
against these IRBs. In terms of—so I wrote in the book that by and large police integrity is 
hard, and I stand by that, despite everything that has happened in Baltimore in the last few 
years, including one of the guys I went to the academy with is currently—was recently 
indicted and in prison. At some point you have to trust me on that. And many people don't, 
by the way. I was there, you weren't. I may not be able to convince you of this. People say, 
well, maybe you contaminated the research. Possibly in the sense we all influence our 
surroundings and I was an active participant, not a participant observer. But I was often 
working alone. I would say this, that if it only takes one person to make a whole squad, 
district, department clean, well, that is great news. I wish I had that influence on the people 
I worked with. I don't think I did. By and large cops are clean just because it's a job. You 
don't want to get fired because you'll lose your pension. That's the consideration. I would—
and I still say this. Certainly not all cops are honest, but the integrity of the police 
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department I saw is certainly higher than the integrity of any academic department I've ever 
worked in. Absolutely.  
  How many of you know of scandals, of rumors of inappropriate relations between 
the faculty and the students?  How many of you have said anything?  Do we have an ivy 
wall of silence?  Well, no. Well, maybe. But more likely I think it's you don't know enough. 
You have an interest in protecting yourself. If you know too much, you're in too deep. If 
there were cops that gave me—you know, made my “spidey sense” tingle, I was not an 
ethnographer at that point, I just wanted to stay away like any other cop because when the 
crap hits the fan I don't want to be there. That's the interest of self-preservation. Now, does 
that make my ethnography work hard?  Well, yes, because it was a job as well, it was a job 
in my life. But there was an ethical human instinct to preserve my own hide and other hides 
that comes into play that in one way—in some ways was unique to my research and in 
some ways I don't think it was unique to my research. I never set out to write—sort of write 
a kiss and tell or do an exposé of policing. And I consider myself empathetic to police 
officers and policing. But you can certainly take things from my book and weave a very 
negative portrayal of policing as it was done Baltimore. I think by definition, taking it out 
of context, but it's there. Those are the editorial decisions I made. I will say I did not go in 
with any sense of advocacy or knowledge. I really went in completely ignorant about the 
world I was going to enter. For better or for worse. Just sort of—I had no—not only didn't 
have a stake in the game, I didn't even know what the game was in terms of the world I 
was seeing.  
 So I want to talk about some of the ethics of data and data criticism a little bit. I 
mentioned earlier, I think it is important not to conflate downright fraud with 
misinterpretation or errors, or even using hearsay as fact. I should reread my book. I haven't 
read it in years. I don't think I ever would report something I didn't see as fact. It never 
would occur to me. Gosh, that just seems to me an obvious lie that maybe hasn't been stated 
explicitly enough in ethnography. But that's a good line. Don't relate other people's stories 
as fact, relate them as stories. I think it could come off as fact. That said, I will say when I 
read On the Run—look, I read it and said this portrayal is (inaudible), I don't believe it. I 
said I think there are errors. I don't think the errors are always in the places you spotted 
them. The same with the hospital thing, to talk to people in the hospital and saying that 
would never happen. I can vouch that it is not common practice. I never heard of it. But I 
worked at Johns Hopkins Hospital. I would be shocked if it hadn't happened. That's all I 
am saying.  
 Now, whether she witnessed it is another issue. But the idea that it doesn't happen 
I find patently unbelievable. Cops, of course, they will do anything they can. And cops and 
nurses are tight. I mean, this is their sort of home in a way. The relationship between 
hospital personnel and police officers is very much of camaraderie, and I can easily imagine 
a situation where a cop says, "Let me see that clipboard," and someone gives it to them in 
violation of HIPPA rules and laws and everything. I never saw it, but I believe it has 
happened. Which is different than saying downright I saw something that didn't happen. I 
know Alice personally. I'm not close to her, but I consider her a friend. I did not review the 
book, despite being asked for it many times. I didn't want to review the book because I had 
serious problems with it. But I think that ignores in a way that—and I hate terms like greater 
truth because it is a way of hiding things that are not true. But there is a greater truth. I read 
the book with a certain polarized filter that said I don't need to sort of—some of this I think 
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is crazy, is wrong. I don't think—to me that wasn't what her book was about. I think it 
suffered a bit from advocacy that—I mean, if I have time to get into it a little bit—as 
opposed to simply having a point and relating data. I think it was weak when it got into 
advocacy and theory. The strength in her book is she hung out with, befriended and wrote 
about a hidden population that probably no one in this room has ever dealt with in any in-
depth level. I mean, I would say as a police officer in Baltimore I dealt with it at a different 
kind of level, but I saw it enough to understand that thank God someone wrote this book 
and is describing this.  
 And in criticizing the book, which you didn't, Steve, but as other people have, that, 
you know, white girls shouldn't be doing that, well, you know, then you go and do it. Like 
how dare you say that she can't transcend class and race boundaries to befriend—these 
were her friends. To say she shouldn't write about it. I found a lot of the criticism not only 
to be unjustified, beyond your book, but also missing the point and the fabulous world she 
revealed that needs to be out there. So is that a greater truth?  I don't know. But there are 
errors in qualitative analysis, and you point those out very well. And perhaps, even if it's 
not formal fact checking, yes, we should be more careful about that. I don't know if the 
errors in qualitative analysis are worse than the errors in quantitative analysis. And I find 
that as the idea—I don't like describing myself as a scientist as my own personal choice of 
identity. I think of science very much as hard science, and I'll leave it to Claudio to say 
whether that is even science. But I don't know what I would do.  
 I'm an academic, I'm a professor, I'm a criminologist. I'm not even in the sociology 
department anymore, but I don't mind being called a sociologist. I'm a writer. I think Mary 
made many very good points, one of which is the quality of your writing matters and it is 
one reason why some things get out there and others don't. I think ethnographers tend to 
write better than sociologists, and I think journalists write better than ethnographers. Just 
because something is replicable—yesterday somebody said, you know, just because you've 
replicated doesn't mean—I think it was Colin—doesn't mean it is replicated. 
 
MR. COLIN JEROLMACK:  Yes. 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  But there is also the issue of errors come in different factors. You 
know, my favorite criticism almost of all quantitative analysis is what about your 
nonrandom missing data. They never answer it. But nonrandom missing data is a serious 
problem with statistical analysis. And if we're talking say 20%, 30% missing data, depends 
on the sample, that's usually a fatal flaw, but they just put a little qualifier saying, you 
know, it's a limitation and then go on. And in the language of the traditional scribe class, 
write above the comprehension of most of the world, and even most academics, and you're 
supposed to trust that ultimately their conclusion means what it does. To put it in my world 
of crime data analysis. Until the Guardian and the Washington Post, and one guy who does 
Fatal Attraction—not Fatal Attraction, Fatal Encounters. Two very different things, but 
they both unfortunately up in death. Started keeping track of police-involved shootings, 
our only source was Uniform Crime Reports, which it turns out now we know in hindsight 
were missing 50% of police involved killings.  
 Now, until two years ago a lot of people were using that Uniform Crime Report. 
And, of course, you can say yes, science corrected itself. But that is not enough because 
basically for decades we were using data that was invalid and presenting it as truth. And, 
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yes, it's nice we can use better data, but that doesn't screw up the flawed studies in the first 
place. There is a new study, which I haven't read yet, about body cams in Washington, 
D.C., that says they have no effect. I haven't read it yet. I really have nothing to say about 
if it's valid or not. But if it's—I find it hard to believe cameras don't have some effect. But 
this is now being reported out there, and I hope it doesn't become the truth. Well, science 
has proven that body cameras don't matter. We don't know that yet. So let us not hold 
qualitative data to a higher standard than quantitative data.  
 Understand that errors come in different ways, that no data is perfect, and strive to 
make it the best. Let me just mention a way that could perhaps help the future gathering, 
ethical gathering of data. I don't think an adversarial system is a productive one. As Mary 
also said yesterday, anyone who spends time in a court is shocked at how dysfunctional it 
is, and it's not a search for truth. It is a bad template from which to base the system.  
 Now, that said, there might be good aspects that come from it. But the idea that an 
adversarial system is somehow a model for anything I find, from my own knowledge of 
courts and the law, kind of disappointing. Nor do I think a regulatory approach works 
because then you get sort these of abusive expansion of the IRB. Perhaps ethnography 
needs a sort of honor code to—and I mention this because I went to a college that had one. 
I saw a lot more teaching in high school—a lot more cheating in high school. And then I 
went to college—I also cheated in high school occasionally on German exams. I didn't in 
college because I had to sign an honor code, because it was no longer a game. Because I 
said I wasn't going to cheat, there was no proctor, and then I had to do it. Perhaps as a 
reminder to researchers and grad students you should sign a little code saying I promise 
that all my—everything I say is going to be true. I think people go into the field thinking 
that, and then whether it is because of advocacy or deadlines, perhaps then me make stuff 
up. You can certainly make up quantitative data as well, by the way, as has been done. But 
I'm afraid that the simple fact of fact checking field notes would be like pushing a security 
barrier at the airport forward or back.  
 If you want to cheat, you can. You can lie on your field notes just as well as you 
can lie in your analysis of the field notes. At some point, given the fact that we're 
professionals and, you know, honorable people, I think we have to—it does rely on trust. 
Though it is a tough standard to enforce legally, I think it is a better way to sort of enforce 
the idea of trust of your data, loyalty to your research subjects, up to a point, is a better way 
to achieve ethical behavior than some of the adversarial or legalistic approaches. Thanks.  
 
MS. JULIET SORENSEN:  Thank you, Peter. In my Public Corruption and the Law class 
as a complement to more traditional assignments I always assign the book Behind the 
Beautiful Forevers by Katherine Boo. You may have read it. I've never before thought of 
it as an ethnography; I've actually thought of it as a form of long-form journalism, which I 
tell my students is an important complement to the legal system in terms of addressing and 
in some instances uncovering or exposing corruption. This past spring was the first time 
that I had ever received feedback from a student criticizing the fact that the author was a 
white American. I thought that was interesting that I received this criticism of the book, 
and implicitly of my assigning the book in this class. I don't know if it was part of a series 
of conversations that roiled the law school community to some extent really since the 
presidential elections in November. But actually I thought that the more interesting 
question is one that Peter mentioned with regard to Alice Goffman, which is to say why 
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couldn't the book have been written by somebody else? Who should those others be? At 
least in terms of a book like this reaching an audience like us. So it's definitely worth 
considering that. And the fact that the book has been written at all may be in and of itself 
worthwhile. So I want to turn this over to our three illustrious responders. I encourage us 
to make this all an interactive conversation. We have Gary Fine, Colin Jerolmack and 
Shamus Khan. So, Shamus, why don't you start with some responses. And, again, this will 
be interactive, but I'll go more or less down the line. 
 
MR. SHAMUS KHAN:  Okay. I'm going to make six points and I'll make them concisely, 
so hopefully in three to five minutes. The first is just a correction. I write a lot with Colin. 
I did not write the anonymous piece with Colin, the anonymity piece. It's written by Alex 
Murphy, a really wonderful sociologist at the University of Michigan. She does great 
ethnographic work, not urban ethnographic work, but ethnographies of suburban poverty. 
And she deserves credit for that piece, not me. So I just wanted to air that since I feel like 
I got credit for writing it multiple times in this discussion and I don't deserve that. 
 
MR. COLIN JEROLMACK:  I actually don't even know what you think about anonymity. 
 
MR. SHAMUS KHAN:  The second is, with all due respect to the person who is working 
the hardest in the room this entire time, the stenographer, we are not stenographers. So I 
might ask one provocation, which is to say what does it mean if our subjects disagree with 
the accounts that we provided. And would we always want to give the supreme primacy 
to, say, their verification of our accounts. Or do we believe that we do something more than 
provide, say, a transcription of what they say that may in fact differ from their 
understanding of what they're doing. The third is to point to the importance of changing 
details, something that we would disagree on with the text, and the ethics of that.  
 I'm going to give you a story from the sexual assault project that I've been working 
on. It's about a young man whose parents are undocumented workers from Pakistan, who 
is gay and therefore cannot go home during the winter breaks. So he has found different 
office spaces that have been abandoned in New York to sleep in during the day and then to 
ride the subway at night. And often reported to us engaging in sex work in order to help 
subsidize his summers—I mean, winters and other expenses. And this is something that he 
told us. And it's important to write about because there are certain ways in which we find 
within our work that precariousness increases the likelihood of being assaulted. So people 
who experience precariousness, particularly economic precariousness, have much higher 
rates of assault than other people.  
 Now, I did not tell you the right details of this young man's life. They're close to 
what I just said, but it's not accurate. The problem is if I told you the real details of his life, 
as you might imagine, there aren't that many gay Pakistani children of undocumented 
immigrants who attended Columbia University between the years 2015 and 2017. And to 
out him as being someone who did that would perhaps be beyond what is responsible in 
this context. But I think that the story is important enough, and it's not important just in 
terms of a pornography of poverty, but it helps us understand the ways in overlapping forms 
of precariousness actually expose him to a lot of risk and drive him to a set of behaviors, 
reported behaviors—so we didn't observe these behaviors, he talked to us about them—
which I wouldn't feel comfortable reporting if I told you the real story, the quote/unquote 
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real story. So changing details in that context is actually really important, and I would say 
it's not that rare. I want to reiterate the idea that it is sometimes not great to get consent 
forms.  
 We didn't get consent forms in a lot of the sexual assault research we did because 
we didn't want names associated with the research in any way. So that if people filed 
requests to get our information they could not connect, say, the population of people we 
talked to, the 150 to 175 of them in interviews, to the actual transcripts. And that struck me 
as— 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  There is a basic dilemma here, which is signed consent forms and 
anonymity. That is not addressed enough. 
 
MR. SHAMUS KHAN:  And then finally I want to ask one provocative question, and then 
I'll shut up. The question is if the existence of an example of a deviation from, say, a norm 
within ethnography, or at least things we can critique as bad ethnography, is a good thing 
or a bad thing. So we might suggest that where you find no violations of ethical rules, 
norms and other kinds of things within an academic space we should be happy. But I would 
suggest the reverse. That, in fact, the presence of this conference may actually suggest a 
robustness to this. And we may be much more worried about fields where there is no 
contention about these sets of issues because it means that ideas that push or don't exist, or 
that the norms are actually not normative.  
 So I would remind us of like my favorite discussion in all of sociology is 
Durkheim's discussion of crime and the ways in which people—crime is a normal 
phenomenon and that there are these normative things that require us to sort of recommit 
ourselves to it. I may worry more about an ethnographic context where a book like Lubet's 
could not be written because everyone so strictly conforms to some set of rules. Now, we 
could have pathological versions of this where we had too much violation of this, but I 
might suggest that this is a sign of something actually kind of healthy within a space. And 
also suggest that the debate has not been squashed.  
 The discussions have been actually quite public and they have had impacts on the 
field, and this is a sign of actually a really healthy area. I now insist on seeing all of my 
students' field sites, I visit their field sites. I do things as an advisor that I probably wouldn't 
have done in light of this. It suggests a kind of robustness to the area that I think, you know, 
we might want to acknowledge and think through and ask, maybe it's worse if cases like 
this didn't exist and what would that mean. And some of the demands it seems that are 
being made upon ethnography towards always revealing sources, only doing research 
under a very set of circumscribed conditions could actually lead to a much more 
impoverished research space than the one that we have right now. 
 
MS. JULIET SORENSEN:  Thanks, Shamus. I agree that as a general matter an injunction 
to be open to reevaluation and reexamining our methodology, our supervision of our 
students is more—is worthwhile and is what keeps the field dynamic and on the cutting 
edge. I'm going to ask our presenters to hold off until all the responders are done. So, Colin, 
over to you. 
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MR. COLIN JEROLMACK:  You know, one important thing related to ethics with our 
research subjects that hasn't come up, I don't think, a single time in this conference is the 
ethics of representation. So, Steven, I think it's useful, but some of your concerns around 
criminality I would categorize as harm that we don't stop, but that is already happening. 
But there is also—and I don't want to exaggerate the extent to which it may be true; I 
actually think we don't know the extent to which it is true—a harm that we create through 
the way that we portray people. And I don't know the answer to this because I don't think 
that IRB’s should be able to expand their powers to how we represent our subjects. But we 
harp a lot on how we have to protect them in research, and how protecting them means 
pseudonyms and masking, and that may or may not be true.  
 I'm really drawn, and actually sometimes heartbroken, by the ethnographers who 
take the time and have the honesty to write about what happened when they showed the 
book to their subjects. It seems that sometimes the extent to which their subjects feel hurt 
and betrayed has nothing to do with whether they were identifiable to anybody else. In her 
new edition of Unequal Childhoods, if you have not read this, Annette Lareau returned to 
the family she wrote about. There is no evidence that anybody's confidentiality was 
compromised, yet she said that half the families were deeply troubled by the book. Some 
felt that it made them look bad. Others felt that her portraits failed to grasp the core 
elements of their own subjective experience. For example, one family complained that 
Lareau seemed to not take seriously the fact that the kid might actually enjoying playing 
violin and that's why they go to all these violin lessons, that it's not just about cultural 
capital. Nancy Scheper-Hughes writes something similar about the Irish village she 
studied. Her subjects said that they saw her book as a “science of scandals”. She only wrote 
about their troubles and not their strengths. I think what these responses indicate is that 
some of our subjects may have folk definitions of research ethics, what they consider to be 
ethical research, that are totally orthogonal to the way that IRBs, or even, as Bob says, 
professional ethnographers think about ethically responsible research. It may have nothing 
to do with the confidentiality principle in some instances. And what worries me, actually, 
is that they may be largely incompatible with the norms of scholarly writing. Because what 
we say is yes, Annette's job as a scholar, which makes this sociology and not journalism, 
is that the Tallinger family, whose kid played the violin so many hours per day, is a social 
type. And that's what we are doing, we are creating generalizable stories.  
 It's not about the particular people, it's about the types that they represent. That's 
our prerogative. But that may not be our subjects’ prerogative, and I wonder about the 
amount of times that we don't know that's the case because people don't do what Annette 
or Nancy did, which is go back, or they don't want to tell us about it because makes us look 
like terrible human beings. So I would just say this, relating back to confidentiality and 
masking, if it's out of a sense of ethics that we mask, I think it's worth recognizing that 
masking might do little to reduce the unanticipated costs that our knowledge production 
produces for our subjects. And these costs are often borne quietly and anonymously unless 
scholars go back, as Annette did, and revisit these subjects and write about it at a later date. 
That's it. 
 
MR. SHAMUS KHAN:  Can I add one thing? 
 
MS. JULIET SORENSEN:  Sure. 
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MR. SHAMUS KHAN:  I just wanted to mention I looked up about whether certificates of 
confidentially have been legally challenged. There are very, very few cases. The one case 
that is sort of widely reported is from 1973 when its authority was upheld by the New York 
Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court declined to take up the case. This could either be 
evidence that no lawyers have decided to challenge it, or that it's seen as codified in law. 
I'll let the lawyers interpret that for us. But apparently it has basically been since '73 that 
there have been cases that have challenged it. That's why we were given the advice that we 
shouldn't think of it as settled law because there is so little case law around it. 
 
MS. JULIET SORENSEN:  Sort of like the emoluments clause today. Gary, you presided 
yesterday, but Steve said you didn't say your piece yesterday. Now is your chance. 
 
MR. GARY ALAN FINE:  Well, Julia, what I would like to do is throw the floor open for 
discussion, and then if I could get maybe the last ten minutes. And then we'll let Steve say 
what he wants to say, which I predict will be to thank us all and to say that the elevator 
story is still wrong. So let's have a discussion and— 
 
MR. STEVEN LUBET:  There will be a word or two about ethnographers in cars with 
guns. 
 
MR. TIMOTHY HALLETT:  Yes. Alright. So since we're talking about ethnographers in 
cars with guns, this goes back to the point that I raised earlier about the very real crisis and 
détente that happened in ethnography as realist assumptions were confronted with 
postmodernist subjectivity, feminist critical understanding and radical subjectivity. Since 
then ethnographers have tried to do a lot to temper their sort of vainglorious assumptions 
about reality and ultimate source of truths. And one of the things that happened in 
Goffman's book is that the methodological appendix was very much an effort to address 
the ethics of representation. Because she is a white woman studying African American men 
and to address the issue of positionality, and very much to address how close she came—
you know, something that ethnographers talk about all the time, the dilemmas of going 
native and how close that can come to be.  
 So this was something that she had to do in contemporary ethnography to deal with 
the postmodernist, impressionist, confessionalist critique of realist ethnography, it's 
something that the discipline demands. It's also something that very much got her in hot 
water in her account. So, you know, one—Gary and I have talked about this, and one thing 
glibly that we could say is she shouldn't have burned her field notes but she should have 
burned her methodological appendix. But, the other way to say this is she didn't do a very 
good job as a realist ethnographer and she didn't do a very good job as a postmodernist 
ethnographer either. Or we could say she's damned if she does and she's damned if she 
doesn't. And that's the complexity and difficulty of reviewing ethnography from a 
particularist perspective without the context of the whole. 
 
MS. JULIET SORENSEN:  Any response from the presenters? 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  No. 
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MS. JULIET SORENSEN:  You left them speechless. 
 
MR. COLIN JEROLMACK:  I'll say one small thing about this. I was somebody who, 
when my book was peer-reviewed the second time, was asked to write an ethnographic 
appendix, which I refused to write. I felt like I inserted into the book the moments where I 
needed to be to tell you how I came to know the things I know. I that what you sometimes 
see in these ethnographic appendices is a literal checklist. What's interesting is that, as 
ethnographers, we often want to unpack and make variables messy, but then we'll say, like, 
"I was white. Here is how being white affected what I did in the field."  "I was a man. Here 
is how being a man affected what I did in the field."  You know, "I was young when I did 
this. Here is how being young . . . ." These are statements that sometimes are obligatory.  
 But there is this way in which we sometimes create this laundry list of our various 
attributes and then attribute causality to them with more confidence than we make our 
causal statements about what's going on in the field. So I do think this is something we 
have to reconcile and deal with. On the other hand, I concede that I was uncomfortable 
with some of the moves that Matthew Desmond did to write himself entirely out of the 
book, to the point where you have to read an endnote to find out that the friend who lent 
the U-Haul truck to someone being evicted was him. I felt like I needed to know that in the 
book. So I'm not saying that we go back to the fly on the wall, but I have gotten a bit 
uncomfortable sometimes with the way that methods appendices get written to try to deal 
with this postmodernist, feminist critique. 
 
MS. MARY PATTILLO:  So I have a question I think for Shamus and Bob, or maybe 
Shamus and Gary, about IRB. So my understanding is actually along the lines of what a 
couple people—oh, I think what Peter said. IRB is in many ways to protect the university 
and sometimes the research, not often the subjects. And then we hear the story, Shamus, 
that when you need some protection, when you get a subpoena, they're like, go hire your 
own personal lawyer. So my question to maybe Gary and Shamus is what is the university's 
response or responsibility once they vouch for your research when it is needed? 
 
MR. SHAMUS KHAN:  So I just want to—for those of who were not here, the notes from 
my first book have been subpoenaed just last week, so I'm dealing now with the question. 
In terms of the university's quote/unquote refusing to protect me, I think that's probably 
good legal advice. The lawyers here may have a better interpretation of this. But their job 
is to protect the university, and there are probably instances where the interests of the 
university and my interests are not going to align and under those conditions I may want 
independent counsel.  
 Now, this means—I mean, I didn't just contact Colombia's general counsel. I also 
contacted Princeton's, because Princeton published the book, and Wisconsin because 
Wisconsin approved my IRB as a graduate student when I did the research. The other two 
general counsels have not gotten back to me. I think they're just hoping it goes away and 
that they'll be made aware if there is some relevant thing that happens. I'm kind of curious 
to see what happens there. 
 
MR. ROBERT NELSON:  You signed that contract. 
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MR. SHAMUS KHAN:  What? 
 
MR. ROBERT NELSON:  You signed that contract with Princeton. No doubt there is a 
disclaimer. 
 
MR. SHAMUS KHAN:  I'm sure there is. 
 
MR. STEVEN LUBET:  I crossed those out, by the way. 
 
MS. JULIET SORENSEN:  I'm sorry. I did miss this earlier reference. Is this a grand jury 
subpoena in a criminal investigation? 
 
MR. SHAMUS KHAN:  No. It's a civil case against a school that I have—I spent a year 
documenting things. So they want all of that documentation. I think in this instance it's—
you know, the way that I've been thinking about this for the last week is the difference 
between my legal obligations, which is certainly to turn over the material, and then my 
obligations to my subjects, which is not to turn over the material. And the challenge in 
thinking through this is that even—you know, the obvious solution is to just redact the 
material sufficiently and hopefully have that be allowed and then give it to them. But even 
that it strikes me violates some of the ethical commitments that I made to the research 
subjects. So I suspect that there will be like procedural solutions around this, but I'm not 
very equipped to think through it.  
 The IRB, it's interesting to think, could intervene actually in this instance in order 
to protect the research subjects, right?  To say that there were a series of commitments that 
were made and it's our responsibility as an IRB because we certified this research in this 
way to actually protect the information from these people. I've never heard of an IRB doing 
that. It would be a very interesting move for them to undertake. I doubt in this context that 
the University of Wisconsin, a public university in this current political climate would be 
the institution that would first do that. 
 
MS. JULIET SORENSEN:  I've never heard that as a basis for a motion to quash a 
subpoena, which is the legal way in which it would be presented. 
 
MR. GARY ALAN FINE:  I remember back in 1975, when I was first doing my research 
on Little League Baseball, and this was before the Belmont Report before the IRBs were 
before human subject committees where we still called them ethics committees, I think. 
And the reason that I was very happy to have my research with Little League Baseball go 
before them is because I was driving kids around in my little, what was it, Plymouth, and 
I was told by Harvard that if I got in an accident Harvard University would cover me up to 
$3 million per person if we had some crash. So I felt really good about that.  
 I think the important thing, one of the things I've emphasized as a social 
psychologist, is to remember that institutions are local. And so there is not an IRB, there is 
an IRB at Northwestern. Actually, there are several IRBs at Northwestern, medical school 
versus the social sciences. And that would be true—you know, I hear stories about what 
goes on at the IRB at other schools, and I know it's really quite different from what was 
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done at Northwestern, at least when I was chair, which was in the early 2000s. So there is 
a lot of individual differences. Well, should I— 
 
MS. JULIET SORENSEN:  Well, let's see. As I recall, you asked for the second-to-last 
word, with Steve having the last word. I do want to circle back to our two presenters first 
to see if you guys would like to respond. 
 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER:  And there is another hand in the back. 
 
MS. JULIET SORENSON:  Thank you. 
 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER:  This may be of no interest to people. But there was 
a slight discussion yesterday about the organization research practices. I gather Shamus is 
now part of a team that involves multiple methods and multiple disciplines. Mary said that 
she still prefers to work as an individual ethnographer and writer. So I wonder has there 
been any discussion as to how a number of these problems regarding validity within a 
hermeneutical science could be solved or addressed more effectively by working more in 
teams? And I ask this in part because of one reason, the physical sciences have become so 
powerful in the last 40 years because they've become ever more collaborative and ever 
more grounded in laboratory research. I'm wondering if the social sciences should be doing 
more of that. 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  Interesting. I share Mary's belief. I like working alone and 
working on the cheap and avoiding the whole mess of hassles that comes from 
collaboration. I wonder if collaboration in the other fields is more simply out of publication 
issues and getting your name on publications and less out of how it helps the research, 
though still may help the research independently. One of the things I didn't say because of 
time reasons, but I think if anything ethnography should resist the urge to sort of set up a 
single set of standards and practices. Now, that may sort of be separate from a collaborative 
question. But I do find that insecure academics that always look up in the field to the more 
quantitative, whether they admit it or not—and I think we're all in this room probably 
qualitative.  
 But sociologists seem to be insecure when it comes to economists and 
anthropologists seem to be slightly insecure when it comes to sociologists. In academia we 
all look down on journalists, with good reason, and I don't know what the journalist 
perspective of that is. But I think even given the constraints of ethnography that there is 
still such variety that we would—in a way I think it's better to be a band of misfits. I think 
we would suffer if we decided that the same ethics that apply to, say, doing research up in 
the power structure as opposed to doing research down, those I think would be entirely 
different matters.  
 I don't think one size fits all in this thing. In terms of collaboration, I very much 
wish that On The Run was written in Baltimore when I did my research. It would be a 
fabulous sort of collaborative—even in that case a serendipitous and collaborative effort. I 
presented one side of a very small part of a really small community. I would prefer to see 
collaboration in a way being at a broader level than sort of three people trying to so the 
same thing, both in terms of efficiency but also in terms of knowledge based. 
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MS. ANNA MUELLER:  I just want to—so I actually personally do think that 
collaboration could be an interesting sort of methodological approach to solving some of 
the issues within ethnography. I work collaboratively on a qualitative in-depth case study 
with one colleague who is—we're both assistant professors, and so it is not quite what 
Shamus or I think what Mary described where there are sort of—it's like a true—we go 
into the field together, we've done interviews in like side-by-side rooms, we talk, 
sometimes he goes to the field, sometime I go to the field, and so on and so forth.  
 But we do notice difference things in the field and by, you know, sort of rigorously 
debating and challenging each other—we have different specialties within the field of 
sociology, and it just means that we pick up on different things that aren't necessarily 
incompatible, right? So I think in the end our work has been much more robust because 
we've had two—well, also, we're both white, but he's a man and I'm a woman and that 
actually allowed us some flexibility with some respondents who felt more comfortable with 
a woman or more comfortable with a man. It was just—I don't know. So I actually see a 
lot of value in going into the field— 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  Do you think it was twice as robust?  I'm just wondering. 
 
MS. ANNA MUELLER:  I'm not going to say that it is twice. I think that is a mistake, 
that's— 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  Okay. But just better. 
 
MS. ANNA MUELLER:  I don't even necessarily would say that it was better, right?  But 
I think that it is something that I never—I don't really hear that talked about very often 
because we do have this sort of lone wolf model. Or we have the model that I think was 
more like Shamus and many of my friends have engaged in where it's more sort of formal 
organizational ethnography with multiple people following kind of more strict protocols 
so that there is some matching. I'm just offering a third. I'm really actually quite—I'm more 
interested in these conversations and much, much less interested in say, my way is the best 
way. But I do notice that there is no—that this sort of third option in my opinion I rarely 
see it, like, coming up. Perhaps it is special when you have somebody that you can work 
that closely with and that easily with. Some of my collaborations are not that fluid and 
haven't been that much fun, but this in particular works. But I just would stress that different 
things were seen because there were two people with different perspectives actually in the 
field. 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  If you don't want to say it's better, I'll say it's better. It certainly 
doesn't sound worse. 
 
MS. ANNA MUELLER:  I'm not ready to say it's better. 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  Perhaps different – I mean, that sounds great. 
 
MR. SHAMUS KHAN:  I want to throw some cynicism on this, though. 
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MR. PETER MOSKOS:  Yeah, you do that, Shamus. 
 
MR. SHAMUS KHAN:  The Open Science Collaboration, which was a project to try and 
replicate major findings within psychology, was only able to replicate of sort of the hundred 
experiments that they tested in the top journals in psychology only able to replicate one-
third to one-half of the results. There are a host of reasons offered up as to why. At least 
half of the results were non-reproducible. Some was that the methods weren't clearly 
articulated enough. But one of the opined reasons was actually having large scale labs with 
abdication of responsibility where it was much easier to actually imagine that other people 
were doing things in the correct way. So you had these kind of like big organizations where 
it was pretty simple to assume that everyone was doing their job correctly and therefore as 
they sort of pushed forward they were—what they were doing was basically like—I mean, 
kind of p-hacking, but like looking to find significant results. And I would say that like, 
you know—at Columbia, I'm the Arts and Sciences representative for the research 
compliance group, and we see very few people from arts and sciences; we see a lot of 
people from these huge labs.  
 Often the explanations—this is very anecdotal—is well, these are big 
organizational labs, it's hard to keep track of everything that is going on. I would say just 
a little bit of caution because if we look to those fields where there are these big labs, they 
may be increasing in status but I don't know that they're creating systematically more 
consistent and ethically produced and solid knowledge. Psychology certainly isn't. The 
replication crisis in psychology right now is fairly acute. Econ has gotten better, but econ 
has gotten better in part because almost every training program in econ right now demands 
that first- and second-year students reproduce the findings of major papers from the 
previous years. So as you're publishing those papers you know that there is going to be a 
little army of future econ doctoral students reproducing your results. So I think that I would 
be—I would be cautious of all of these sort of mechanical solutions. 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  That doesn't mean we should be cautions of—and this is what I 
mean by we are a wonderful band of misfits when they make the movie. To have—to say 
that we shouldn't have a single bit of norms and standards is not to say we shouldn't have 
any standards. I'm saying sometimes maybe we do need an adversarial standard. 
Sometimes we do need a journalistic standard. It depends on the kind of research you're 
doing. Each of these fields, you know, has its strengths and negatives. And to have—I 
mean, I do think as ethnographers we're just happy to be noticed. Thank you for inviting 
us to the dance, Steve. I'm sorry I didn't dress for it. 
 
MR. STEVEN LUBET:  I like what Shamus is wearing. 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  But there's certainly— 
 
MR. STEVEN LUBET:  And Gary's okay too. 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  Are we going to go through everybody? 
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MR. STEVEN LUBET:  No, we don't have to, Peter. 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  But so replication is fine in some places, in other places it's either 
irrelevant or counterproductive. And so, I don't know, maybe the last thing I would say is 
I want to emphasize the idea that it's important to be good writers, and a lot of that I think 
you could learn from journalists. It is important to understand that we're not necessarily 
telling the story about the person that we're writing about. Often we are trying to use that 
person as an example in a greater truth. But it's not about you necessarily, the research 
subject. I hope that my own research goes beyond the individual ten people I was dealing 
with all the time. I'll stop there. 
 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER:  I wonder what's the difference between studying up 
and studying down in terms of this ethics and law and the presentation of data. My personal 
case is I study Chinese art students back in China who were high school students. And then 
I'm a researcher. I consider it as studying down because I'm from leading university in the 
States. Chinese students, teenagers, see me as a scholar, as, you know, kind of a Ph.D. 
student. So in mind it provided whatever they can to form my research. And in my writings 
I can say whatever I want because I am the author and I can portray them—in terms of the 
style of writing, I can do whatever.  
 Then the second case I'm about to study maybe one of the Hollywood film studios 
and the Chinese (inaudible) owned by China's richest man, and in terms of this research I 
have to obey all these rules and when I present the data it has to be very sensitive. I would 
definitely call—you know, this is a quote from where and it is from which document, but 
in the Chinese art student case I would not do that. So I wonder, you know, like with the 
elite sort of professors who study in urban sociology usually would either be homeless 
people and inmates, a lot of more studying down, so I wonder when you present data and 
in terms of ethics and the law how would you deal with that until we obey the same standard 
or like the same criteria in terms of research. 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  So we have to sort of individually as professionals judge it. One 
of the things I did—and, again, the most I'm saying we shouldn't, if we don't have to make 
people anonymous. I had an extra problem, which is in one instance when I changed names 
because I said I would is I couldn't use characters in a narrative sense because then they 
would be identifiable. That was a writing challenge. I'm trying to write a book that's 
readable and yet I can't have characters or any plot line because you can go through public 
records and get the list of names of people in my book if you wanted to, and I didn't want 
quotes to be attributable to them. So I used a form of masking and sort of had to mix up 
descriptions sometimes for people to appear in different contexts. I never say a lie, I just 
may identify this person as a female sergeant and this one as someone with, you know, 13 
years on because I don't want those two things to be linked. But that's sort of a unique 
situation I think dealing specifically with my research, and I don't know about researching 
up or down. But I don't think there is a single answer. 
 
MR. COLIN JEROLMACK:  I'll be very quick. I just think this is an important point. For 
instance, I'm going to generalize, but friends that I know, and I'm not one of them, who 
study organizations, particularly powerful ones, the organizations have the legal power to 
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affect your representation. So they can say, “Even if you're anonymizing, we have to sign 
off on it.” So this gets back to whether there is an ethics of representation that we may owe 
our subjects beyond what IRB or professional ethics require. Because in the absence of 
those powerful actors, when you are dealing with your students, you're not required as a 
term of getting access to show them what you're going to present about them before it 
comes out in the open. So then for many of us, not all of us, that means that we're not 
compelled to do it so we don't do it. But then those who are more powerful compel us to 
do it, so for them they get to see how they are presented and have some kind of discussion 
about that.  
 Again, I don't know what the answer is because I'm very uncomfortable with the 
idea that I show it to my subjects, and they say “I don't like this, take that out” and so I say, 
“Okay, I'll take it out because you don't like that.” So I'm not saying I have an answer to 
this, but I do think there is a difference where the more powerful get to have more control 
over how they're represented and for the rest of us it's entirely up to the author how they're 
represented. 
 
MS. JULIET SORENSEN:  Bob. 
 
MR. ROBERT NELSON:  Yes. I guess I would say that you don't want to change your 
standards. You're still trying to make a valid argument. But you should—you know, if you 
are an ethnographer as tool or instrument you have to be aware of what kinds of data you're 
getting access to from those two different groups. It may be getting entirely different kinds 
of filtered data from the more powerful as opposed to the less powerful students. So that 
may affect what kind of argument you can construct from the data you get. So you do want 
to be careful in terms of how you analyze that and maybe even in terms of—I mean, there 
is the issue of, you know, protecting subjects and protecting components of the data and 
that may be different in those two contexts too. But, also, what is the audience that you're 
trying to present to? What kind of argument are you actually trying to present in your data 
in those two different contexts? 
 
MS. JULIET SORENSON:  Gary, I think the floor is yours. 
 
MR. GARY ALAN FINE:  All right. Thank you very much. Well, first I want to thank 
everyone at this conference. When Steve and I began to organize it, we said, “Who are 
really smart people that we would really like to hear?” And we were very successful in 
getting a whole bunch of those people here yesterday and today. But in addition I want to 
thank the audience, and particularly the students in the audience. Because what I hope we 
made clear was that these are not closed debates, they are open. And as the students you 
become professors and rise in ranks and become emeritus, et al., that there will be different 
discussions that will occur and that you will be part of the continuation of the debates and 
the discussions that we had.  
 And I thought that I would take a few minutes to think about this conference as it 
inspired me, as what it meant to me. I was particularly struck in light of an article that 
Christopher Wellin and I wrote about fifteen years ago on ethnography as work. And what 
Christopher and I decided to do was that we would treat ethnography, we would treat 
participant observation as if it was any form of work. That we would apply the sociology 
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of work and occupations to ethnography. And I was struck by the way that that approach 
might help us, might inform us today. We have the responsibility of what Howard Becker 
said of telling about society. Well, how will we do that?   
 A lot of people tell about society, and we have heard a number of different—about 
a number of different occupations which tell about society, which use stories, which use 
qualitative data, fieldwork, real experiences, whatever we want to call them. And I wanted 
to talk a little bit about these, because I think that what we're doing is talking about what 
we might call comparative persuasion. That is, how do different occupations construct 
persuasion in ways that are meaningful within their field. Or, we might think of this as 
skepticism embedded in structures.  
 So the first group are, of course, the lawyers. And we've talked about that yesterday 
and some today, that the particular role of the law is very different than the role of the 
academy social scientists. That law is fundamentally adversarial and that has implications 
for how work, how presentations, how stories are considered justifiable or unjustifiable. 
That they are judged by judges, they are judged by jurors. There are people in the courtroom 
who have as their moral responsibility not to be persuaded, that is, the attorneys on the 
other side. And if there was too much persuasion, if the defense attorneys said, well, I guess 
the prosecutor has a good point. That would be a case in effect of malpractice. And, of 
course, you also have your clients who are judging the stories that the attorneys are telling. 
Are these our stories? Is this a justified version of what I as your client believe to be true?  
So that's a view of the way that lawyers treat the kind of fieldwork stories that we are 
engaged in.  
 And then, thanks to Steve Mills and other discussions that we've had, we have 
journalists. And journalists are engaged for the most part, with a few exceptions, of creating 
quick knowledge about the work. They're in there, they have deadlines, they don't have six 
years, except for a very few cases, but they have to get that story quickly and in a way that 
their readers consider truthful. And even more than their readers, the way that their editors 
consider truthful. So that an editor of a journalist's story will ask about particular pieces of 
information. Where did you get that story? And I have to tell you, no one has ever asked 
me that question. And I don't ask my students that question. I push them hard on theory. I 
push them hard on analysis. And I take in almost every case their data for granted. And 
there is very little I can do otherwise, I think. It is a problem that has been raised, of course, 
about On the Run. And a number of people have said, well, what about Alice's advisors. 
She was an undergraduate, she was a graduate student. And I think the important point is 
how rare that would be. How unusual it would be for an advisor to say, well, prove to me 
that this story was right. We just assume as colleagues that the stories, that the field of work 
is accurate as given.  
 Then we have the world which was mentioned briefly of the artist. And the artist—
and I'm thinking here of visual artists. I've done that research recently. The visual artist is 
telling stories, is telling about the world, telling about society, but is doing it in the context 
of a market. In other words, if they tell the story well their work will be collectible, curators 
will look upon it with favor and they can be part of these major shows or purchased by 
important collectors. That's very different than our work which has very little marketability 
for the most part. And when it does, as in the case of On the Run or Evicted, there are 
people who are looking over our shoulders.  
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 Then we have storytellers. We love these storytellers. We love listening to the great 
narrators. Here the issue is the immediacy. It is the story. Is there an immediate response. 
Is there an emotional response. And this involves an audience in situ. Not thinking later, 
not thinking, not reviewing the text, but responding at the time.  
 And then finally there is us. There are social scientists. And our domain, the domain 
on which we are judged, is peer review. And peer review means that I will read an essay, 
an article, a book, and I will sit there and say knowing what I know, do I consider this 
plausible. And knowing what I know about the author, do I consider her credible. And if 
the answers to those questions are yes, it gets my endorsement. And, of course, in many 
cases of peer review, most book reviews in sociology are positive reviews. I did a study of 
reviews in Contemporary Sociology, and those of you who are about to publish a book— 
and, Bob, I don't know if your book has been reviewed. But about 85% of the reviews in 
Contemporary Sociology are positive reviews, and close to 15% are mixed reviews 
fundamentally. So we have this system in which we are primed to like each other. Okay. 
So this represents five of the different ways in which occupations can be organized as a 
means of persuasion. The question we have is how do we examine the truth claims of 
others, that is, our informants, and how do we present and examine our own truth. So the 
issue is persuasion. What is the story, what is the moral. And perhaps, I would like to think, 
that this question is the moral of this conference. Thank you very much. 
 
MR. STEVEN LUBET:  Well, I have to say I'm greatly relieved that 85% of the 
sociological book reviews are positive, but I guess we'll fix that. I think I'm pretty sure 
we'll take care of that problem by and by. The truth is I'm overwhelmed by the response. 
This whole project for me started as a book review which I wrote over the weekend, and it 
didn't occur to me for a moment that I'd still be talking about it two years later. And it was 
actually Gary who said you need to broaden this out into a book. And it was truly probably 
the best professional advice I've ever gotten. And that's what I tried to do. Of course, I think 
I ruffled some feathers along the way. But, you know, I am a fan of ethnography. I said 
that in the preface of the book. It would have been intolerable to read all those 
ethnographies if I hadn't liked them. Just impossible to do. I want to make a few more 
comments about what has happened on this panel and then we'll be done.  
 Shamus, I understand completely why you would change the details about a gay 
person whose life might be in jeopardy, but I don't think that's a warrant for the level of 
detail changing that we see in ethnography. You know, that should be the exception under 
extreme circumstances, and it's not a reason to do it across the board, which is what I think 
many people—in fact, what I'm sure many, excuse me, what a number of ethnographers 
do. But let me go further and say if you are going to do that, I think it requires more flagging 
than a parenthetical in the preface. I'm not saying you did. But sometimes—seriously, often 
I would read the prefaces to the book and they would say details have been changed but 
they don't matter. I think that's an insufficient disclaimer. I think in this particular case it 
would need to be flagged.  
 I'm writing about a person. I have changed the details for the person's protection, 
but here is the point I want to make. Almost like a parable. So to me that is quite acceptable. 
But the across-the-board detail changing, I think, is not acceptable. I would love to see 
ethnographers challenge IRBs. I think you're mistreated by the process. I think you're 
unduly constricted by the process. I don't know how many of you have read Zach Schrag's 
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book Ethical Imperialism. It's terrific. I commend it to you. He also has a blog, the 
Institutional Review Blog. I think it's something that would serve— 
 
MR. PETER MOSKOS:  He's kind of moved on, but he spent some great years of work on 
that. 
 
MR. STEVEN LUBET:  A lot more attention. Bob Nelson said that I don't say what crimes 
are wrong or acceptable. So let me say. I think we should draw the line at risking human 
life. I think we should draw the line at risking human life. And I think that line is drawn ex 
ante, not ex post. So the fact that nobody was ultimately hurt to me is irrelevant. If lives 
were put in danger, as they were, I think that's wrong. And I think no ethnographer should 
drive people around with the thought that somebody might get shot.  
 And if you don't accept that in this example, let me give you a thought experiment. 
Imagine that it's an ethnographer driving around some neo-nazis looking for a synagogue 
to burn. Right? And they didn't find one so nothing happened. You know, do we say, well, 
then, it's okay? You know, it's fine driving around looking for a black person to lynch, but 
we didn't find one so that's just good. I don't think we would say that. And I don't think we 
should say that. So that is—you know, I think it's a fine line. I do want to give you a list of 
ethnographers who have written about crimes but have not been subpoenaed. Alice 
Goffman, Laurence Ralph, Philippe Bourgois, Randall Contreras, Victor Rios, Matthew 
Desmond, Laud Humphreys, William White and Howard Becker. Those are just the ones 
I could think of in the moment. So, Shamus, I'm terribly sorry this happened to you. I think 
there is a solution. It may not be cheap. But it is unusual. It is unusual. And I don't think 
fear of subpoena is really going to dramatically alter the practice of ethnography. I'm 
delighted to have provided a helpful provocation, whoever said that. 
 
MR. SHAMUS KHAN:  It wasn't all of us. 
 
MR. STEVEN LUBET:  I'm a big fan of ethnography. I plan to continue reading 
ethnography. I'm looking forward to your work in the future. This has been a true education 
for me. And I want to thank all of you for delivering that to us. 
 
MS. JULIET SORENSEN:  This concludes the panel, the conference. Thank you all for 
coming to the Bluhm Legal Clinic, and enjoy your sunny Saturday. 
 
